On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

Defining the Limits of Federal Court Jurisdiction over States in Bankruptcy Court.

Sovereign immunity jurisprudence has always been a confusing jumble of assumptions which seem incomprehensible. Despite the confusion, understanding sovereign immunity has become more important in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. The constitutional issues raised in Seminole Tribe amount to a reinterpretation of the fundamental balance of power between federal and state governments and the power of Congress to affect that balance. Not all sovereign immunity is sovereign immunity. Many courts use the term to identify both the common-law doctrine and the “immunity” granted to the states through the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. The substantive differences between sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity affect congressional ability to abrogate or waive the latter, but not the former. Sovereign immunity is a judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity derived from the common-law premise that the king could do no wrong. Both federal and state government enjoy sovereign immunity. Because it is not constitutionally guaranteed, it may be waived by legislative action. Congress’s ability to waive the immunity from suit guaranteed to the states in the Eleventh Amendment is more limited than its ability to waive common-law sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution. Seminole Tribe is a major shift in constitutional interpretation. The implication of the holding with respect to the balance of power between the state and federal governments is serious. Yet, rather than being the death knell to the bankruptcy system, Seminole Tribe is an anathema only to those counsel which rely on bullying tactics to accomplish their ends. To the extent it forces parties to negotiate fairly with states, Seminole Tribe will ultimately prove to be a benefit to the bankruptcy system

The Case for Dynamic Models of Learners' Ontologies in Physics

In a series of well-known papers, Chi and Slotta (Chi, 1992; Chi & Slotta, 1993; Chi, Slotta & de Leeuw, 1994; Slotta, Chi & Joram, 1995; Chi, 2005; Slotta & Chi, 2006) have contended that a reason for students' difficulties in learning physics is that they think about concepts as things rather than as processes, and that there is a significant barrier between these two ontological categories. We contest this view, arguing that expert and novice reasoning often and productively traverses ontological categories. We cite examples from everyday, classroom, and professional contexts to illustrate this. We agree with Chi and Slotta that instruction should attend to learners' ontologies; but we find these ontologies are better understood as dynamic and context-dependent, rather than as static constraints. To promote one ontological description in physics instruction, as suggested by Slotta and Chi, could undermine novices' access to productive cognitive resources they bring to their studies and inhibit their transition to the dynamic ontological flexibility required of experts.Comment: The Journal of the Learning Sciences (In Press

Bend it like Beckham: embodying the motor skills of famous athletes.

Observing an action activates the same representations as does the actual performance of the action. Here we show for the first time that the action system can also be activated in the complete absence of action perception. When the participants had to identify the faces of famous athletes, the responses were influenced by their similarity to the motor skills of the athletes. Thus, the motor skills of the viewed athletes were retrieved automatically during person identification and had a direct influence on the action system of the observer. However, our results also indicated that motor behaviours that are implicit characteristics of other people are represented differently from when actions are directly observed. That is, unlike the facilitatory effects reported when actions were seen, the embodiment of the motor behaviour that is not concurrently perceived gave rise to contrast effects where responses similar to the behaviour of the athletes were inhibited

Effects of classification context on categorization in natural categories

The patterns of classification of borderline instances of eight common taxonomic categories were examined under three different instructional conditions to test two predictions: first, that lack of a specified context contributes to vagueness in categorization, and second, that altering the purpose of classification can lead to greater or lesser dependence on similarity in classification. The instructional conditions contrasted purely pragmatic with more technical/quasi-legal contexts as purposes for classification, and these were compared with a no-context control. The measures of category vagueness were between-subjects disagreement and within-subjects consistency, and the measures of similarity based categorization were category breadth and the correlation of instance categorization probability with mean rated typicality, independently measured in a neutral context. Contrary to predictions, none of the measures of vagueness, reliability, category breadth, or correlation with typicality were generally affected by the instructional setting as a function of pragmatic versus technical purposes. Only one subcondition, in which a situational context was implied in addition to a purposive context, produced a significant change in categorization. Further experiments demonstrated that the effect of context was not increased when participants talked their way through the task, and that a technical context did not elicit more all-or-none categorization than did a pragmatic context. These findings place an important boundary condition on the effects of instructional context on conceptual categorization

Revealing criterial vagueness in inconsistencies

Sixty undergraduate students made category membership decisions for each of 132 candidate exemplar-category name pairs (e.g., chess – Sports) in each of two separate sessions. They were frequently inconsistent from one session to the next, both for nominal categories such as Sports and Fish, and ad hoc categories such as Things You Rescue from a Burning House. A mixture model analysis revealed that several of these inconsistencies could be attributed to criterial vagueness: participants adopting different criteria for membership in the two sessions. This finding indicates that categorization is a probabilistic process, whereby the conditions for applying a category label are not invariant. Individuals have various functional meanings of nominal categories at their disposal and entertain competing goals for ad hoc categories

A functional-cognitive framework for attitude research

In attitude research, behaviours are often used as proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes. This practice is problematic because it conflates the behaviours that need to be explained (explanandum) with the mental constructs that are used to explain these behaviours (explanans). In the current chapter we propose a meta-theoretical framework that resolves this problem by distinguishing between two levels of analysis. According to the proposed framework, attitude research can be conceptualised as the scientific study of evaluation. Evaluation is defined not in terms of mental constructs but in terms of elements in the environment, more specifically, as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses. From this perspective, attitude research provides answers to two questions: (1) Which elements in the environment moderate evaluation? (2) What mental processes and representations mediate evaluation? Research on the first question provides explanations of evaluative responses in terms of elements in the environment (functional level of analysis); research on the second question offers explanations of evaluation in terms of mental processes and representations (cognitive level of analysis). These two levels of analysis are mutually supportive, in that better explanations at one level lead to better explanations at the other level. However, their mutually supportive relation requires a clear distinction between the concepts of their explanans and explanandum, which are conflated if behaviours are treated as proxies for mental constructs. The value of this functional-cognitive framework is illustrated by applying it to four central questions of attitude research

Higher Height, Higher Ability: Judgment Confidence as a Function of Spatial Height Perception

Based on grounded cognition theories, the current study showed that judgments about ability were regulated by the subjects' perceptions of their spatial height. In Experiment 1, we found that after seeing the ground from a higher rather than lower floor, people had higher expectations about their performance on a knowledge test and assigned themselves higher rank positions in a peer comparison evaluation. In Experiment 2, we examined the boundary conditions of the spatial height effects and showed that it could still occur even if we employed photos rather than actual building floors to manipulate the perceptions of spatial heights. In addition, Experiment 2 excluded processing style as an explanation for these observations. In Experiment 3, we investigated a potential mechanism for the spatial height effect by manipulating the scale direction in the questionnaire. Consequently, consistent with our representational dependence account, the effect of spatial heights on ability judgments was eliminated when the mental representation of ability was disturbed by a reverse physical representation. These results suggest that people's judgments about their ability are correlated with their spatial perception